We describe a simple 2-stage mechanism whereby for two bargainers, a Buyer and a Seller, it is weakly dominant to report their true reservation prices in the 1 st stage. If the Buyer reports a higher reservation price than the Seller, then the referee announces that there is a possibility for trade, and the bargainers proceed to make offers in a 2 nd stage. The average of the 2 nd -stage offers becomes the settlement if they both fall into the interval between the reported reservation prices; if only one offer falls into this interval, it is the settlement, but is implemented with probability 
Introduction
How to get players to go to their "bottom lines" in bargaining is an age-old problem. Multiple parties on the same side can be induced using a sealedbid second-price auction, or Vickrey, auction [15] , whereby (with multiple [3] show that when players bid for rooms in a house in which they share the rent, the "gap procedure" creates a kind of partial independence, motivating the housemates to make truthful bids that sum to the total rent of the house.
While VCG mechanism induces truthful-reporting, it cannot be both ex-post budget balanced and ex-post individually rational. Many intuitive mechanisms that are budget balanced do not induce honest reporting. When two bargainers haggle over the price of some good or service, averaging their offers ("splitting the difference") does not induce honesty, because it gives them incentives to exaggerate in opposite directions. When reservation prices are uniformly distributed, Chatterjee and Samuelson (CS) [5] show that this mechanism has a simple symmetric equilibrium in which exaggeration is piecewise linear.
1 While Myerson and Satterthwaite [10] show the CS mech-anism maximizes efficiency for the symmetric uniform case, there is also an infinity of asymmetric equilibria (Leininger, Linhart, and Radner [8] ). Hence, the CS mechanism cannot form the basis of a scheme that always induces truth-telling.
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In this paper, we give a simple two-stage mechanism whereby two bar- , but otherwise not; if neither bargainer's offer falls in the overlap interval, there is no agreement.
Besides historical reasons, why do we care about making truth-telling a weakly dominant strategy? The designer may wish to gain information about the distributions of reservation prices, which could be useful to similar agents in reaching an agreement or could be used to create a better mechanism. 3 In otherwise, there is no agreement, and the players get nothing. 2 The Revelation Principle (see Myerson [9] ) implies that any equilibrium (such as CS)
can be converted into a truth-telling mechanism by creating for each player a "robot" programmed to play the equilibrium strategy corresponding to the value it receives from the player. For instance, in a first-price, two-player auction with a uniform distribution of values, it is an equilibrium to bid half one's value. One can induce truth-telling by changing the rules so that the highest-bidder-wins but pays half his bid. To modify the CS mechanism with uniform values in a similar fashion, one can use the average of three numbers: the two bids and the expected value. However, if the Revelation Principle is used to create schemes, truth-telling may not be a weakly dominant strategy or even the unique equilibrium, as we see with the CS mechanism. For background information on mechanism design, see [11] . 3 Distributional information is quite important for Google and Yahoo in helping set their reserve prices for advertisements. Also, releasing information about toxic loan bundles may the absence of truth-telling, gaining this information would be impossible if there were multiple equilibria, and it could be difficult even if there were not.
A designer would need to learn the reservation prices from the bids by inverting equilibrium strategies. If the designer knew less than the agents about the distributions of values, then he would not know the equilibrium strategy to invert. In practice, the problem of acquiring distributional information is aggravated when agents have heterogeneous knowledge or make mistakes. This is ameliorated by employing a mechanism that has a weakly-dominant strategy to truth-tell.
As we will show, our procedure, like another probabilistic mechanism
[2] that we discuss in section 5, is not maximally efficient (Myerson and Satterthwaite [10] ). In particular, if the players have uniform distributions over each others' reservation prices, it is not as efficient as the the mechanism of Chatterjee and Samuelson [5] , in part because of the random draw when exactly one offer falls in the overlap interval.
But even if no agreement is realized, our procedure does reveal-if it continues to stage 2-that the reservation prices of the bargainers allow for a mutually profitable agreement. This information may be useful for other parties that bargain under similar circumstances. Again, the VCG can obtain this information by inducing truthfull reporting (and is weakly dominant), but it cannot be both ex-post budget balanced or ex-post individually ratioaid in their sale.
nal.
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Another benefit of our mechanism is that there is a positive probability of settlement even for extreme reservation values; in contrast, bargainers with extreme values have no incentive to bargain under the Chatterjee-Samuelson mechanism, because there is no possibility of any agreement. Finally, the simplicity of both the rules and the equilibrium should appeal to both experimentalists and practitioners.
The Mechanism
We consider the possible sale of an object by a Seller to a Buyer. If they can agree on a price p, the object will be transferred from Seller to Buyer, and the Seller will receive p as compensation. Of course, Seller prefers a higher p, whereas Buyer prefers a lower p. If they cannot agree on a p, there is no sale.
For definiteness, our discussion is phrased in terms of a possible sale, but our mechanism has many applications, such as to the settlement of a claim by an insured party against an insurer. In that case, the insured party, preferring a higher settlement, plays the role of Seller, with the insurer in the role of Buyer.
We model the Seller's reservation price for the object, S, as the value of a random variable with cumulative distribution function F S . The Buyer's 4 Another mechanism that induces truth-telling in weakly-dominant strategies asks
Buyer and Seller to submit their reservation prices and independently draws a possible sale price at random from a given distribution. If the price is satisfactory to both Buyer and Seller, then a sale occurs at that price. This mechanism is similar to the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure [1] , but the latter is less efficient since any price is determined independently of values. One strategy for a player weakly dominates another strategy for that player if the first yields an expected utility that is at least as great as the second, no matter what strategy is chosen by the opponent. A (BayesianNash) equilibrium is a profile of strategies with the property that each player's equilibrium strategy maximizes the player's expected utility, given that the opponent plays according to its equilibrium strategy.
To represent our mechanism, we use two functions, 
We can construct a strategically equivalent mechanism by retaining stage 
where p is determined by the first condition of (1 
A Simple Truth-Telling Mechanism
We define truth-telling as follows: Buyer's monotone hazard rate condition is satified iff Buyer's cumula-
Definition 1 Seller's strategy ( S, s) is truth-telling if S(S)
Similarly, Seller's monotone hazard rate condition is satisfied iff Seller's cu-
If both Buyer's and Seller's monotone hazard rate conditions are satisfied, our procedure has a unique truth-telling equilibrium, as shown next. 
Proposition 1
Consider the information provided by (3) about Seller's choice of strategy functions. The first integral of (3) depends on S but not s, and the second integral of (3) depends on s but not S. Therefore, Seller maximizes its expected utility by choosing S to maximize the first integral and s to maximize the second.
We address Seller's choice of s to maximize the second integral of (3). Buyer's optimal offer, and its relation to the monotone hazard rate condition for Seller, are analogous. In particular, if both monotone hazard rate conditions are satisfied, there is a unique truth-telling equilibrium, which we denote (S, s * ; B, b * ).
With the substitution B(B) = B, this integral becomes
5 5 Riley and Zeckhauser [14] , among others, solve a problem similar to finding s to maximize W (s), which can be interpreted as a monopolist's optimal take-it-or-leave-it offer. The problem is also equivalent to finding a buyer's optimal take-it-or-leave-it offer. can "afford" to be truthful in stage 1. In fact, a player cannot do worse by reporting its reservation price truthfully in stage 1, and may do better, so we say that under our mechanism each player has an incentive to report its reservation prices truthfully.
Our proof that (S, s
The story is different, however, in stage 2: Each player will have an incentive to shade its offer, depending on the distribution of the opponent's reservation price. In the next section, we illustrate, for two specific distribu-tion functions, how much shading is optimal.
Examples
For our examples, we assume C = 0 and D = 1, so that 0 ≤ S, B ≤ 1.
Example 1 Uniform distribution:
The players' optimal offers, s * (S) = , and Buyer never offers above at equilibrium. If B > 7 8 , there will be a sale with probability ). A transaction occurs with probability . This inequality defines the area above the dashed line in Figure 2 . We compare mechanisms using the expected surplus they produce, which because of our assumptions equals the total expected utility of Buyer and Seller after the transaction, if any. For an "ideal" procedure, which produces a settlement whenever the players' reservation prices overlap, the total surplus is The surplus from our mechanism is 1 2
which is 
Example 2 Power distribution:
It is easy to verify that these distributions satisfy the monotone hazard rate conditions. Buyer's optimal offer is b * = αB 1+α
and Seller's is s * = 1+βS 1+β
, in agreement with Example 1, which corresponds to α = β = 1. For example,
B and s * (S) = 
Conclusion
We have demonstrated a simple and elegant 2-stage mechanism that induces two bargainers to be truthful in reporting their reservation prices in the 1 st stage; if these prices criss-cross, the referee reports that there is an overlap interval, and the bargainers make offers in a 2 nd stage. The mean of these offers becomes the settlement if they both fall in the overlap interval. If only one offer does, it is implemented as the settlement price with probability There is also the possibility of combining our mechanism with that of Chatterjee-Samuelson. The designer would collect the information (b, s, B, S) and then run the CS mechanism with probability α and our mechanism with probability (1 − α). For all α in (0, 1), it would be weakly dominant to tell the truth. When α is close to 1, it would approach the efficiency of CS.
7
While our mechanism is less efficient than the Chatterjee-Samuelson mechanism in the case of the uniform distribution, it does have several features to recommend it, including the possibility of a transaction even for extreme reservation prices. Also, under monotone hazard rate conditions, there is a unique truth-telling equilibrium (and, even without these conditions, it is almost always unique). Under our mechanism, truth-telling in the 1 st stage is always optimal, but other behavior may produce the same results. However, for a player whose value falls within the range of 2 nd -stage offers of the opponent, the equilibrium strategy of truth-telling is strictly optimal.
Part of the inefficiency of our mechanism stems from the random implementation of a 2 nd -stage offer, s or b, as the exchange price when only one offer falls in the overlap interval. Randomizing the implementation of a single inside offer is the penalty one pays to render a player's reserve independent of its offer in the expected-payoff calculation, thereby making it optimal for the player to report truthfully its reservation price. This independence would be broken, and it would be suboptimal for a player truthfully to report its reservation price, if single inside offers were implemented with certainty. [2] analyze other mechanisms that induce two bargainers to be truthful, including a "bonus procedure" in which a third party induces the bargainers to be truthful by paying them a bonus when their bids criss-cross. But it is their "penalty procedure" that is closest to the present mechanism in inducing truth-telling behavior.
Brams and Kilgour
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Under it, the bargainers make simultaneous offers in a single stage, with the proviso that the probability of implementation of a settlement is a function of the degree of overlap, if any, in the bids: the greater the overlap, the higher this probability. 9 It yields a surplus of 1 12 , which is 50% of the maximum possible surplus, and thus falls short of the 88.9% achieved by the present mechanism. Moreover, unlike the present mechanism, the players never learn whether their failure to settle was because (i) their reservation prices did not criss-cross (as in stage 1), or (ii) they did criss-cross but probabilistic implementation prevented a settlement in the 2 nd stage. In principle, however, they could be told whether (i) or (ii) prevented a settlement; if (ii), they might be motivated to try again, but not using the present mechanism (see discussion below).
An advantage of the present mechanism is that the players always learn The knowledge that the optimality of shading one's "bottom line" in stage 2 was all that prevented a settlement might motivate other bargainers in a similar situation to try to find an agreement by other means (e.g., face-toface informal bargaining, mediation, etc.). We stress, however, that under dures are given in Kilgour, Brams, and Kaplan [7] . 9 The probability of a certain settlement in the present mechanism also increases as the overlap of the 1 st -stage reserves increases, because a greater overlap increases the likelihood that both players' 2 nd -stage offers will fall into the overlap interval, ensuring a settlement.
our model, the bargainers must assign probability 0 to the possibility that they could benefit from the procedure when it produces no agreement.
